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Rule-following as coordination: A game-theoretic approach
Giacomo Sillari
University of Pennsylvania

Make the following experiment: say “It‟s cold here” and mean “It‟s warm here”. Can you do it?
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §510.
I can‟t say “it‟s cold here” and mean “it‟s warm here”—at least, not without a little help from my friends.
David Lewis, Convention.

Abstract
Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations
describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox
involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rulefollowing behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say
that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions
sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea (cf.
P.I. §§ 198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as a convention is in place. In particular, I
consider the game-theoretic definition of convention offered by David Lewis and I show
that it illuminates important elements of the communitarian understanding of rulefollowing1.

0. Introduction

The slogan that “meaning is normative” (and the normativity of rule-following in
general) is best understood in the context of strategic interaction in a community of

1

Many thanks for useful commentaries and discussions to Peter Baumann, Cristina Bicchieri, Liz Camp,
Ka-Yuan Cheng, Richard Eldridge, Francesco Guala, Simon Huttegger, Rohit Parikh, Jan Sprenger, Kevin
Zollman, Brian Skyrms, and audiences at the 2008 Summer School Urrutia Elejalde on Social Norms, San
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individuals. Famously, Kripke has argued in (Kripke 1982) that the central portion of the
Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution.
Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines conditions
of assertability in the language, and conditions of correctness for rule-following behavior.
A battery of argument is used to argue that meaning (or, in general, rule-following)
cannot be explained by resorting to an individual‟s mental states, or her past use, or her
dispositions. By exclusion, this indicates that no descriptive fact is constitutive of
meaning and that “meaning is normative” or, for the purpose and scope of this article,
that rule-following is a normative notion. The normativity of rule-following is related to
the correctness conditions that hold in a community. Indeed, membership in the
community depends on one‟s record of compliance2 with the correctness conditions. But
what do such conditions precisely consist of? How are they sustained in the community?
And is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule-following3?

The central thesis of this article is that the skeptical solution put forth by Kripke can be
illuminated if looked at in the context of the strategic interaction taking place in a
Sebastian, the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria, the 83 rd meeting of the
Pacific APA in Vancouver, Canada, the Philosophy Department at Swarthmore College and the 37 th
meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy in Alberta.
2
Cf. (Kripke 1982: 91-2): “Any individual who claims to have mastered the concept of addition will be
judged by the community to have done so if his particular responses agree with those of the community in
enough cases […] An individual who passes such tests is admitted in the community as an adder; an
individual who passes such test in enough other cases is admitted as a normal speaker of the language and
member of the community.”
3
While Kripke himself uses the terms meaning and rule-following rather interchangeably in (Kripke 1982),
in some cases the two terms need not be equivalent. In the following, I tackle the issue of rule-following
and of the nature of correctness conditions, leaving the analysis of meaning to a companion paper.
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community. Wittgenstein states that a rule can be followed only insofar as there is a
habit, a social convention in place. Building on Wittgenstein‟s observation, we will read
the skeptical paradox of the central portion of the Investigations, as well as Kripke‟s
skeptical solution in light of David Lewis‟s definition of social convention in his seminal
Convention: A Philosophical Study. Lewis offers his account in the context of the theory
of games, as we do in this paper. The game-theoretic analysis allows us to better
understand the role played by the community in the skeptical solution and, in particular, it
will allow us to explain in greater detail the role played by some key notions in the
Kripkean approach, as those of agreement, Lebensform and blind action.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section 1, I introduce Lewis‟s theory of
convention and briefly discuss its normative content. In section 2, I address two
objections to the opportunity of a Lewisian and game-theoretic approach to rulefollowing. In section 3, I interpret Wittgensteinian rule-following in terms of Lewisconventions. In section 4, I discuss the relation of the notions of Lebensform and common
knowledge, while section 5 will be concerned with Wittgensteinian blind action in the
context of evolutionary game theory.

1. Convention as Coordination

3

Wittgenstein states (§§198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as there exists a custom, a
convention. Yet, as Bloor (1997: 27) points out, “[w]e need more than a generalized
awareness of the importance of social processes: we need a specific understanding of
what is meant by the word „institution4‟.” I claim in this paper that Lewis‟s gametheoretical account of convention can answer such a need, and that in fact the idea of
rule-following as participation in a social custom or institution is illuminated when
looked at through the lens of David Lewis‟s theory of convention. Lewis argues in
(Lewis 1969) that coordination games (situations of strategic interaction in which the
interest of the players roughly coincide) underlie every instance of convention, in that a
convention is a regularity in the solution (equilibrium) of recurrent coordination games.
The agents participating in the convention conform to the regularity because they prefer
conformity over non-conformity, conditional on other agents‟ conforming. They form the
belief about other agents‟ conformity through some coordination device: explicitly—
through agreement—or tacitly—because a certain action stands out as the one that most

4

Shortly thereafter, Bloor (ibidem) complains that “positive ideas on the subject has been conspicuous by
their absence,” and proceeds to put forth his own positive notion of social institutions, drawing both from
philosophy (Anscombe) and sociology (Barnes.) I‟m highly sympathetic to Bloor‟s view, in which a social
institution is defined as a “collective pattern of self-referring activity” (Bloor 1997: 33). While Bloor
approvingly mentions Lewis‟s formal rendition of the Humean account of social convention, he does not
emphasize the strategic element inherent in social conventions—the game-theoretic idea that an agent (and
indeed the whole community) is better off coordinating her behavior with that of others on the prevailing
social convention. But it is precisely this material element that, as I shall argue throughout this paper, gives
explanatory strength to the game-theoretic understanding of social institutions and in so doing clarifies the
notion of the normativity of rules.
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likely (almost) everyone will pick. Such an action is salient5 to the parties. In the case of
a recurrent coordination problem, a special kind of salience—precedent—is at play.

For an instance of a coordination game involving salience as a coordination device,
suppose that two friends are hiking a trail at a distance from one another. The first hiker
reaches a bifurcation. She does not expect the hiker who is behind to be able to see which
path she is going to take, hence she collects a few stones and sticks and improvises a
signpost. The interest of the hikers coincides (they want to pick both the same path) and
the situation is strategic, in that each hiker prefers one direction over another conditional
on the choice of the other. The situation can be depicted by the following matrix in which
the numbers in each cell correspond to the payoffs received by the players

II

I

left

right

left

(1,1)

(0,0)

right

(0,0)

(1,1)

The matrix represents the interaction described above, and inspection promptly reveals
that it possesses two (pure6) equilibrium points (R,R and L,L), that is two combinations of

5

The notion of focal point was introduced by Schelling (1960) as the explanation for successful
coordination in informal experiments.

5

actions such that in each of them no player has an interest to change her action.
Coordination on one equilibrium point rather than another (in the example, R,R rather
than L,L) is achieved by using the signpost as a coordination device, the salient
equilibrium being the one obtainable by following the direction indicated by the hand of
the signpost. We could stretch the example further and imagine that the two friends find
themselves often in the situation just described. Instead of the elaborate signpost
procedure, over time they could rely on more expedite mechanisms to achieve
coordination. They may even simply rely on past coordination and always take the path
to the right, which has become salient as a coordinative outcome because of precedent. It
has become a regularity.

Such a regularity, which in Lewis‟s account constitutes a convention7, is sufficient for
some degree of normativity to arise8. Indeed, in a community in which a certain custom is

6

The game also possesses a (weak) equilibrium in mixed strategies. In particular, if player I plays left and
right with probability ½, then any action of player II nets player II the same payoff as any other action.
Similarly for player II playing left and right with probability ½. Hence neither player has (in a weak sense)
an interest to deviate from such randomized strategies.
7
Lewis‟s almost final (and sufficient for our purposes) definition of convention is the following (cf. Lewis
1969:58):
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common
knowledge in P that, in any instance of S among members of P,
(1) everyone conforms to R;
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since R is a
coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in
S.
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in place—say, the custom of going by signposts—there is an equilibrium in the actions
and beliefs of the agents involved such that the agents prefer conformity to the custom,
provided that all other members in the community act according to the convention. If I do
not go by sign-posts, or I go by them in a funny, abnormal way (for instance, going in the
direction opposite to the one indicated, as mentioned, e.g., in §85) I act contrary both to
my preferences—because I will not get where I intend to go—and to the preferences of
other members of the community—because, say, I will end up being late, or not showing
up at all. My reputation will suffer9. This indicates that, in general, parties to a
convention feel the pressure to conform, to some degree. As Lewis puts it10, “conventions

The notion of common knowledge was introduced in the philosophical literature by Lewis‟s essay.
It indicates the state of affairs in which every agent in a group G of agents knows that p, everyone
in G knows that everyone in G knows p, and so on. The notion of common knowledge has
generated a vast literature in disparate fields, from logic to mathematics, to psychology and
computer science. For a general overview, let me refer the interested reader to Vanderschraaf and
Sillari (2007) and the references therein.
8
Approaching the issue of normativity of conventions from the other endpoint, Gibbard (1994: 98-99)
says: “How, then, do I explain accepting a norm? I explain it by placing it in a speculative psychology.
Accepting a norm, I hypothesize, is a state of mind that is linked to a special kind of linguistically infused
motivation or tendency. The tendency, roughly, is to do what the norm says. The psychic mechanisms that
underlie this state have as a chief biological function coordination through discussion---with coordination
taken in the broad, game-theoretic sense expounded by Thomas Schelling (1960: ch. 2).” Similarly,
Gibbard (1990: 64) states that “[s]ystems of normative control in human beings, I am suggesting, are
adapted to achieve interpersonal coordination. What might this mean? To answer this I sketch work of
Thomas Schelling on rational coordination in pursuit of human goals, and John Maynard Smith‟s
evolutionary analog of Schelling‟s theory.” As Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008: 278) rightly points out,
however, “[p]roblems of interpersonal coordination are certainly important for understanding human
nature, but not all interpersonal decision problems are problems of coordination, even under the broad
conception of coordination urged by Gibbard.” I will expand on this issue in the next section.
9
Thus, Lewis (1969: 99): “The poor opinion [other parties] will form of me, and their reproaches,
punishment, and distrust are the unfavorable responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the
convention.”
10
But cf. Guala (2008) for a different interpretation of this quote.
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are a kind of social norms.” They have varying degrees of normative force, depending on
how serious the consequences would be, were the convention to be broken11.

2. Rules and Games

Before defending the claim that rule-following in the sense of Wittgenstein is best
understood as a regularity in the solution of coordination problems—that is, as a
convention in the sense of Lewis—I need to answer two methodological objections. First,
in Convention Lewis does take into account rules (cf. Lewis 1969: 100-107) to conclude
that it would be difficult to single out a sense of the word “rule” that agrees with his
definition of convention. Second, it may seem that by using Lewis‟s game-theoretic
approach in interpreting Wittgenstein‟s rule-following considerations, I am endorsing the
view that Wittgensteinian language-games could or even should be understood
exclusively in the context of game theory, while such context appears to be much too
narrow to accommodate the cluster concept of “language-game.” I respond to these
objections below.

11

Cristina Bicchieri (2006) distinguishes between conventions, descriptive and social norms. The
distinction at work here is the one between descriptive and social norms. The dynamics of the (possible)
acquisition of normative force by a descriptive norm is succinctly captured by Bicchieri (2006: 39): “what
starts as a descriptive norm may in time become a stable social norm,” and more extensively analyzed in
Bicchieri (1993: ch. 6).
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As for the first objection, Lewis points out in a section of Convention entitled “Rules”
that “[w]e might be tempted to try distinguishing several senses on the word “rule,”
hoping that one of them would agree with my definition of convention” adding
immediately thereafter that, however, “I doubt that the project would succeed12.” This
assessment follows the analysis of various circumstances indicating that in natural
language there is no perfect overlap between so-called rules on the one hand and Lewisconventions on the other. In particular, while all instances of convention can be thought
of as (informal, tacit, unwritten, etc13.) rules, not all “so-called” rules can be thought of as
conventions. For instance, there are rules enforced so forcefully that one has an incentive
to abide by them regardless of the behavior of others, hence the element of coordination
is lacking and we cannot properly speak of a convention in the sense of Lewis. There are
norms issued by some authority or power such that one has an incentive to obey them
unless everybody else disobeys. Since the incentive to follow the rule is (almost)
unconditional, these rule do not qualify as conventions in the sense of Lewis either. There
are social or political obligations whose underlying strategic interaction is best
represented by games of cooperation rather than by games of coordination, and hence
again they are not conventions in the sense of Lewis14. There are many so-called rules
12

Cf. Lewis (1969: 105.)
Cf. Lewis (1969: 100, 105)
14
A game of cooperation is a strategic interaction in which the socially optimal outcome (in which the sum
total of the payoffs is maximized) requires the cooperation of both players, while individual rationality
pulls each player toward non-cooperative strategies, leading to suboptimal outcomes. The paradigmatic
example of a game of cooperation is the prisoner‟s dilemma. Each player can “cooperate” or “defect”.
From an individual player‟s point of view, the best outcome obtains when she defects while the other
player cooperates; the second best when both players cooperate; the third best when both players defect and
13

9

that do not necessarily presuppose an underlying game-theoretic structure at all: this is
the case of maxims, generalizations, laws of nature, hypothetical imperatives, and so on.
On the other hand, “[i]t is harder to argue that some conventions are not naturally called
rules15.” And indeed it is this direction of the relation between conventions and rules that
interests us here. In fact, a different way to state the claim of this article is to say that
Wittgensteinian rule-following deals with situations identifiable insofar as a there is a
custom. Thus, while not all rules are interpretable as Lewis-conventions, all rules
pertinent to Wittgensteinian rule-following16 involve a conventional element and hence
can be analyzed as pertaining to situations in which individual preferences regarding their
actions are conditional. Such situations are consistent with Lewis‟s analysis of
convention in terms of coordination and in fact, as the rest of the article will show, are
best understood as recurrent coordination problems.

To respond to the second objection, notice that the question crucial to the framework of
this article is the following: Are we entitled to cast the rule-following considerations in a
the worst outcome obtains when she cooperates while the other player defects. The need for a more
expansive use of game theory in modeling social phenomena and conventions was very early recognized by
Ullmann-Margalit (1976). In addition to coordination, Sugden (1986) makes essential use of cooperation
and of several other game-theoretic tools in modeling rational social interactions. Binmore‟s complex and
bold theory of justice and the social contract (1994, 1998, 2005) has both games of coordination and
cooperation as its basic building blocks. In the words of Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008): “[t]he key to
our moral nature, rather, lies in the fact that we all face repeated interpersonal decision problems—of many
types—in socially structured environments.”
15
Cf. Lewis (1969: 104.)
16
Wittgenstein does not appear to be indiscriminate in his concerns with rules, cf. Zettel §320: “„cookery‟
is defined by its end, whereas „speaking‟ is not. […] You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by
rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess, you are playing another
game.”
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game-theoretic account of convention? Now, the multifarious abundance of the remarks
constituting the Philosophical Investigations is notoriously unsystematic. The vagueness
of the family-resemblance notion of language-game is lost in the exactness of the
mathematical definition of a game. For example, the process of inventing and changing
language-games is often mentioned in the Investigations, yet in the game-theoretic
approach we consider pre-existing games whose structure does not change upon
repetition. Moreover, some kinds of linguistic interactions that Wittgenstein subsumes
under the family-resemblance notion of language-games can difficultly, if at all, be
analyzed in game-theoretic terms. However, there is a similarity that criss-crosses and
overlaps throughout the examples17 of §23 and elsewhere, and that is relevant to the
game-theoretic interpretation I am proposing here. Most of the examples of languagegames in §23 and elsewhere in the Philosophical Investigations function when immersed
in a strategic interactive context18. Let me use a few examples to illustrate the idea. First,
consider “guessing riddles.” Guessing a riddle presupposes the existence of a framework
in which an utterer uses a metaphoric and figurative language, or a pun, or semantical
ambiguity to convey a definition through images that allow, roughly speaking, for a
uniquely consistent semantical interpretation. Meanwhile, the audience attempts to
17

Let me remind the reader of the variety of those examples: “Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements […] Reporting an event—Speculating
about an event—Forming and testing a hypothesis […] —Singing catches—Guessing riddles—Making a
joke; telling it” and so on.
18
If some (e.g. “singing catches”) seem to resist game-theoretical analysis, for other items in the list of §23
a game-theoretic perspective sheds interesting light. Consider e.g. “[f]orming and testing a hypothesis.”
Bicchieri (1988) explicitly analyzes rules of scientific methodology as Lewisian conventions. More
recently, Zamora-Bonilla (1999, 2006) argues that game theory can be fruitfully applied to understand
essential aspects of the scientific enterprise.
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produce such a unique consistent interpretation. One who is listening to a riddle (or
reading it) and who does not understand it as the (ambiguous) definition of some thing or
notion is equivocating and betraying the intentions of the author, and in so doing she
makes the riddle, along with its meaning, vanish into thin air—or at least into
uninteresting literal prose. Second, consider “reporting an event” and “speculating about
an event.” Again, the function of the audience is essential: Suppose that the governor has
been arrested today. “The governor was arrested on corruption charges” and “The
governor is guilty of corruption” are successful instances of reporting and speculating on
the event only insofar as the audience recognizes the former utterance as declarative and
factual, and the latter as hypothetical and possible. If an audience mistakes “The governor
is guilty of corruption” for a factual, declarative utterance, the mismatch between the
utterer‟s and the audience‟s understanding of the linguistic exchange is such that it ceases
to qualify as a “speculating on an event” language-game. Lastly, consider the famous
“builder-assistant” example of a language-game (§2). Here the builder asks the assistant
for the stones necessary to the construction; the builder calls, for instance, “slab!” or
“beam!” and the assistant brings him a slab or a beam. In this interaction, the builder
observes a state of affairs (lack of a slab, say), emits a corresponding signal (the call
“slab!”), and the assistant performs a corresponding action (brings a slab.) The strategic
component should be apparent: the interaction between the builder and the assistant is
successful if and only if slabs are brought when slabs are needed, beams are brought
when beams are needed, etc. Thus, for the assistant bringing a slab is the correct action

12

given that the signal “slab!” has been sent to him because of a lack of slabs, and the
signal “slab!” is the correct signal to send if bringing a slab is the assistant‟s correct
response to it. This is in fact a problem of coordination of the same kind as those
underlying Lewis‟s account of convention19.

Even though the strategic element is essential for several instances of Wittgensteinian
language-games, it remains true that large parts of the Wittgensteinian analysis are lost in
a formal, game-theoretic account. For instance, the process of inventing and changing
language-games is often mentioned in the Investigations, but in the game-theoretic
approach we consider pre-existing games whose structure does not change upon
repetition. As I have just pointed out, some kinds of linguistic interactions that
Wittgenstein subsumes under the family-resemblance notion of language-games can
difficultly, if at all, be analyzed in game-theoretic terms. It is no surprise that the „clusterconcept‟ of language-game cannot be entirely covered by a game-theoretical account. As
mentioned above, coverage is lost of some cases Wittgenstein draws our attention to.
Other cases we can cover, losing some of details yet, to be sure, gaining in clarity. As I
hope the rest of this paper will demonstrate, in a game-theoretic framework concepts that
are key to the rule-following considerations can be more closely scrutinized and elements
of the communitarian approach to rule-following better specified and illuminated.
19

Cf. also §86, in which „tables‟ are imagined that serve the purpose of linking given signals to appropriate
action, with different systems of „arrows‟ pointing from signals to actions emphasizing the arbitrariness of
the interpretation of signals. In fact, the „table‟ and the „arrows‟ of §86 can be thought of as representing
the „receiver‟ portion of a Lewis-signaling system.
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3. Rule-following as Coordination

The crucial sections concerning the “paradox” of rule-following revolve around §201. In
§198 it is clarified that interpreting a rule is not sufficient to show what an agent is to do
in order to follow the rule. All interpretations “hang in the air” (§201), possibly
contradicting one another. They seem to be conceptually closer to thinking that one is
obeying the rule rather than to actually going by the rule (§202.) The relation between the
expression of a rule and the agent‟s action is perhaps established by a learning process
(§198), indicating not only20 that the connection between the expression of the rule and
the action in accord to it is of a causal nature, but also that the existence of a convention
is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of rule-following.

Thus, when judging whether an agent adheres to a rule, we cannot base our evaluation on
interpretations (be them the agent‟s, or ours) of the rule. Rather, we need to observe the
agent‟s action—or, better, her interaction with others. While an agent‟s choice of action
may remain in some instances the endpoint of an interpreting process21, action ceases to

20

Following McDowell (1984: 360, n. 22,) I split the last paragraph of §198, assigning the first period to
the interlocutor. Also, I take the “Nein; ich habe auch” of the last reply to the interlocutor as countering the
“Aber damit hast du nur” (my emphases) in the interlocutor‟s line. Thus, the “nein” is not entirely
adversative, but rather it can be read as “not only.”
21
However, the interpreting process cannot ultimately produce a justification for action. I shall say more
about the issue of justification in the next section.
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be an interpretation and manifests the only instance of rule-understanding that is liable to
verification22.

In his skeptical solution, Kripke maintains that, while many interpretations of a given rule
may arise, there is (roughly speaking) only one correct way to abide by the rule. The
correct application of the rule is determined by the community. In particular, the
customary action is the action that accurately corresponds to the rule. The agent is
supposed to do “what he is inclined to do” (Kripke 1982: 88) and his action is then
assessed against the background of community practice. So, there is no logical link
between rule and action, but rather a psychological link, validated (or countered) by the
customary practice that have place in the community. One problem with this solution is
that the paradox suggesting the impossibility of solipsistic rule-following applies also to
the community. How is the customary action determined? Why is it so defined? As in the
solipsistic case, communitarian interpretations of the rule based on past use are no
sufficient grounds to answer such questions, since the rule is susceptible of a multiplicity
of interpretations also when the task of determining rule-obeying behavior is left to the
community rather than to its individual members. Communal dispositions do not provide
firmer grounds23. Still, while “each of us […] calculates new addition problems, […] the

22

Many agree on this matter, from both the individualistic and the communitarian sides: from the former,
cf. for instance Baker and Hacker (1984;) from the latter, e.g., cf. Meredith William‟s argument about the
primacy of action (Williams 1989: 183 ff.)
23
This is a major objection against the view involving community‟s inclinations or dispositions. It recurs in
many arguments by individualistic critics. Kripke himself sharpens his position by pointing out that the
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community feels entitled to correct a deviant calculation” (Kripke 1982:111.) Where does
such an entitlement come from? It is firmly grounded in the practice of the community,
yet while Kripke (ibidem, 95-101) spells out the main ingredients of the skeptical solution
(agreement, form of life and criteria,) it remains unclear why and how such elements
succeed in bringing about a (practical) solution to the paradox. Again, it seems, no
descriptive fact discriminates the practice of rule-following from failing to do so, and
again we are lost in the “gulf between an order and its execution” (cf. §431).

Meredith Williams (1989, esp. ch. 6) forcefully defends the community view by putting
forth an original reading of the rule-following considerations that goes beyond both
Kripke‟s skeptical solution and various versions of individualism, most notably Baker
and Hacker‟s “rules as internal relations.” She stresses (Williams 1989: 169) that “[t]he
normativity of rules is grounded in community agreement over time,” although (ibidem:
177) “the community is not required in order to police the actions and judgments of all
members, but in order to sustain the articulated structure within which understanding and

theory that one follows a rule insofar as she acts in the way most people in the community do “would be a
social, or community-wide, version of the dispositional theory, and would be open to at least some of the
same criticism as the original form.” (Kripke 1982: 111). Boghossian (1989: 173) criticizes communal
dispositionalism as a solution of the skeptical paradox. Blackburn (1984: §3) focuses on a similar point to
question the skeptical solution, cf., e.g., “[t]he community is as much at a loss to identify the fugitive fact
as the individual was.” And, further on in the same section: “the skeptic who won against the private
individual looks equally set to win against a community which has the benefit of mutual support.” One of
McGinn‟s (1984) arguments against the communitarian view is that, against what Wittgenstein says in the
Investigations, it endorses the idea of rule-following as an interpretive process in which the interpretation is
yielded by society rather than by the individual. If we cannot resort to a community‟s inclinations or
disposition, then we need to look at the community‟s practice. I maintain that that is best done in the
context of strategic interaction.
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judging can occur and against which error and mistake can be discerned.” The articulated
structure of society forces us to ask questions different from the ones made moot by the
skeptical paradox. Not „what is the correct course of action with respect to a given rule?,‟
but rather „what is the connection between a given rule and action?‟ Not „what is the
grammatically correct way to proceed?,‟ but rather „what grammar is immanent in our
practices?‟ The community does not provide its members with standards against which
they can evaluate whether actions are in accord or contrary to rules. However, the
community is structured in a way that sustains constancy of practice over time, that is
agreement in the way we (generally) follow rules. In this sense, society in its articulated
structure does not police the actions of individuals—that is, does not say outright what
course of action is correct with respect to a rule, checking the rule against a given
standard—but merely sustains an immanent “grammar” of our societal practices—that is,
creates conditions such that coordinative action can be performed. Can we say more
about the articulated structure of society that is necessary to discern correct and incorrect
applications of a rule?

To answer this question, let me elaborate my reading of Wittgenstein following the signpost example. As I understand it, the rule-following phenomenon presented in the
Philosophical Investigations can be analyzed in three elements: the expression of a rule,
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the interpretation of a rule, and the actual rule-following24. Consider again the example of
a signpost. Firstly, the expression of the rule is the physical instance of the sign-post. The
sign-post is merely a piece of wood that “by itself seems dead.” (§432). The existence of
a convention implies that a recurrent coordination game be recognizable. Thus, „going by
a signpost‟ happens only insofar as a strategic interaction involving the use of signposts is
recognizable. The expression of a rule (psychologically) determines the strategic
interaction related to the rule. The expression of a rule makes it explicit that a strategic
interaction is going to take place, and so, in a sense, we could say that it determines that
there will be interacting agents. Secondly, agents interpret the rule. In the case of going
by sign-posts, let us consider agents who have, for simplicity, two interpretations: going
in the direction indicated by the arrow (say, right), or going in the opposite direction25.
Recognizing the structure of the strategic interaction related to the expression of a rule
pertains to the element of rule-interpretation, that is providing strategies on how to follow
the rule. The skeptical paradox stems from the interpretations “hanging in the air along
with what they interpret.” Thus, when interpreting a rule we come up with a series of
possible actions (yielded by several of the vast number of possible interpretations). In the
game-theoretic understanding of rule-following, each of the many interpretations of the
expression is a possible action of the game induced by the rule. Even if we were to carry

24

For a similar exegesis, cf. Arrington (2001).
Of course there is an infinite number of possible strategic interactions that can be associated with any
rule-expression. This implies that the resulting coordination game is arbitrarily large.
25
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out the interpretive process26 and decide that a certain action were the correct application
of the rule, §202 reminds us that no action gains special support by any given
interpretation, since thinking one is following a rule is not the same as following a rule.
Thus, thirdly and lastly, the actual rule-following takes place only in the instant the agent
actually moves away from the sign-post and goes right, or left. This phase represents the
agent‟s non-interpretive grasp of the rule (§201) and constitutes the only portion of the
process described here that can be evaluated. If the agents‟ choices strategically match
the choice of other(s) and the profile of actions constitutes the regular solution
(equilibrium) of the coordination game, then the agents are in fact following a rule and
receiving a positive payoff. The following table is a synthesis of the three aspects of rulefollowing, along with their game-theoretic counterparts:

26

As we shall see more closely in the next section, precedent and strategic reasoning, pattern projection and
common knowledge thereof may all be thought of as parts of a deliberation or of a justification that selects
one action over another (say, going right rather than left.) It remains true that in actuality, deliberation and
justification often leave place to automatic behaviors that are blind (§219) and without justification (§269.)
This does not mean that deliberation and justification should not be part of the analysis, for, among others,
the three reasons listed below. Firstly, there are cases of conventions that are yet not well established (that
is, rules that preserve some ambiguity as to what the correct response might be), and hence leave room for
thinking: coming up with an interpretation and deliberate whether our interpretation is correct. Since the
context is interactive and strategic, an essential part of my deliberation will be my belief about your action,
and my belief about your belief about my action, and so on (cf. passim, and Sillari 2005 for a discussion of
higher-order iterated beliefs in the context of conventions). Secondly, there are cases in which a wellestablished convention fails and the automatic action strikes trouble. In some of such cases, especially if
recurrent, the agent will be interested in checking whether the action automatically performed matches the
preferences and expectation that she may ascribe to other agents in the community. Thirdly, there are cases
in which we are to evaluate the performance of others. To use the example of Brandom (1983: 643-645),
the “parrot trained reliably to say „It‟s getting warmer‟ only as the temperature climbs past 80 degrees
never succeeds in asserting that it is getting warmer”. Its behavior coordinates with ours, but does not
match the preferences and expectations that can justify it. In conclusion, while conventional action and
rule-following behavior is by and large an issue of automatic behavior (cf. Bicchieri 2006: ch. 2), a rational
reconstruction of the system of preferences and beliefs involved in choice and motive is not unwarranted.
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Expression

Interpretation

Action

Recognizing a strategic

determining viable

material outcome

interaction

actions

(players)

(strategies)

(payoffs)

I believe that the game-theoretic structure just described capture the essence of William‟s
„articulated structure‟. In the game-theoretic context, community agreement is a special
kind of agreement in preferences and beliefs that fulfills the definition of social
convention. Agreement in preferences and beliefs (Williams‟s “harmony of society”) is
not the same as a standard of correctness with respect to given rules, but represents the
articulated—that is: strategic—setting in which and through which we can evaluate
action. The strategic setting does not offer any way to extrapolate standards of
correctness. It describes the social interaction that makes rule-following agents better off,
hence sustaining the constancy of societal practice. It does not provide agents with
written-in-stone standards about what they are to do, but makes sure that if they think
others will perform action a in response to rule r, then they will be better off performing
action a as well. Indeed, if we interpret rule-following as regular coordination
equilibrium in recurrent coordination problems27, then there is a clear and compelling fact
to the matter of what “going by the rule” consists of. In particular, individuals who go by
27

Notice that I am not requiring, here, that the equilibrium be identifiable ex ante by members of the
community. What needs to be recognized by the agents is that there is a strategic interaction in place. That
is, the satisfaction of my preferences does not depend straightforwardly on my action, but also, and
essentially, on what you are going to do.
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the rule net a higher payoff than individuals who fail to obey the rule28. The mutually
beneficial outcome is after all the purpose of the sign-post (thought of, a la Lewis, as a
coordination device,) and in this sense we can say, with Wittgenstein (§87), that “[t]he
sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose.” That is, if
we manage to coordinate, perhaps even efficiently, our behavior. Moreover, even if the
community, as Williams explains, need not police the activities of its members at all
times, transgressing the rule may come at a price, both for the transgressor and for the
agents who are interacting with him. Non-conformative behavior thus may in these cases
end up being sanctioned (possibly and eventually with expulsion from the community),
while conformative behavior perpetuates itself, since it is based on the agreement to act
according to given rules. In this sense, agreement is the agreement in preferences and
beliefs that support a specific equilibrium in the recurrent coordination game, while the
normativity of rules may originates from it.

Thus, the “little help” needed by Lewis from his friends in the answer to the challenge of
§510 reported in the epigraph consists then in their agreeing to different preferences and

28

Indeed it sometimes seems that critics of the communitarian solution neglect to consider the pragmatic
consequences of rule-following, that is, in the game-theoretic setting I privilege here, the payoffs for
coordinating behavior as opposed to the payoffs for failing to do so. As Rohit Parikh (2002) emphasizes,
Wittgenstein himself does not always delve on the subject: for instance, in the famous “five apples”
example of §1, the passing hands of money from the shopper to the shopkeeper is elegantly ignored.
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beliefs, switching in so doing from one solution of a recurrent coordination game to
another29. Consider §224:

The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another,
they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the
use of the other with it.
I believe that the view expressed in this section captures the sense in which “agreement”
and “rule” are related: A custom—and hence a rule—does not hold without an agreement
in preferences and beliefs—and hence in coordinative, conventional actions—on part of
the members of the community. In other words, if an agreement is in place, parties to it
now prefer to conform to the agreed upon behavior, and believe that all share such a
preference (and belief). But mutual preferences and beliefs of this kind form a
convention, which has some degree of normative force, hence is a rule. On the other
hand, if a rule is in place, parties to it relinquish their unconditional preferences and
conditionally prefer to conform to the rule. They do in fact have reason to conform
insofar as they believe that others share such preferences and beliefs, i.e. insofar as an
agreement, as described above, is in place.

29

Hacker (1996: 201) points out that in an ironic context one does say “it‟s cold” to mean “it‟s very hot.”
In fact, we can (crudely) game-theoretically account for irony using the following signaling system: player
i feels cold, she ironically sends the signal “it‟s warm in here” expecting the audience to catch the irony and
achieve coordination by shutting the window, rather than take the expression literally and fail to coordinate
by bringing a sweater. The „ironic equilibrium‟ of this simple 2x2x2 signaling game lies with the antisignaling system (cf. Skyrms 1996: ch. 5) of the signaling game.
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So, a rule is a mutual (tacit) agreement to act in accordance to a regularity of past
behavior. The “paradox,” as the second half of §201 explains, turns out to be a
misunderstanding: the myriad possible interpretations of the rule are eliminated by the
existing institution, and we can say that an act is “obeying the rule” only with regard to
the one action consistent with the existing regularity. But our approach, so far, has been
descriptive: I argued that the social structure sustaining rule-following in the sense of
Wittgenstein is a strategic structure sustaining coordination over time. What happens if
the regularity in coordination is broken? The difficult question of justifying a
coordination equilibrium arises, cf. §206: “Following a rule is analogous to obeying an
order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one
person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one
is right?”

4. Induction and Justification

Consider again the example of coordination from section 1. The two friends have
invariably managed to successfully coordinate on many instances, and once again during
their hike they find themselves in the same coordination problem. Except that this time
the leading hiker leaves a signpost indicating right and goes left. Their failure to
coordinate reveals that, in a two-by-two interaction as the one we are considering here,
one of the two, and only one of them, is not following the rule. But who is right?
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In the context of Lewis‟s theory of convention, the individual is right whose behavior
conforms to precedent. Without reliance on precedent, no conventional strategic
interaction in the sense of Lewis is possible and, as I have argued in the previous section,
without the context of strategic interaction the community is in no better position than the
individual in providing a determination as to which course of action is in accord with the
rule. However, a skeptical paradox30 resurfaces in the game-theoretic account of
convention. The paradox parallels the one identified by Kripke‟s in the Investigations. It
is now yielded by the multiplicity of patterns that can be inductively projected from past
conformity onto the coordination problem at hand. Thus, Lewis‟s answer that precedent
works as a coordination device among the players has no teeth when considered by
someone who remains sensitive to skeptical arguments, since the notion of precedent is
susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations just the same as the notion of rule is. In the
more recent literature on this issue (cf. Skyrms 1996, Cubitt and Sugden 2003, Sillari
2005, Rescoria 2007) two main stances on the issue emerge. Brian Skyrms, on the one
hand, emphasizes that in the case of symmetric coordination games the emergence of a
steady convention is a “moral certainty”, although which convention will emerge “is a
matter of chance.” (Skyrms 1996: 93). We shall see the relevance of Skyrms‟s argument
in the next section. Cubitt and Sugden, on the other hand, focus on the role of salience
and inductive standards. For them, a given state of affair (history of past play) provides

30

Cf. for instance the analysis in Cubitt and Sugden (2003: sections 6 and 7). The link between patternprojection in Lewis-convention and Wittgensteinian rule-following is highlighted also in Bardsley and
Sugden (2006).

24

evidence from which players can extrapolate beliefs about future action. In particular,
parties to a convention project a given pattern (call it precedent) because that pattern is
salient to them. They are confident that (nearly) everyone is making the same inductive
inference because inductive standards are shared in the population. The inductive
reasoning based on precedent yields common knowledge (or, more precisely, common
reason to believe) that parties to the convention will conform to it in the next instance of
the coordination problem. Salience—that is, the inductive projectibility of a given pattern
as precedent—generates the regularity that constitutes a Lewis-convention. In turn,
conventions change over time, and our notion of salience changes with them. What
counts as precedent today may not count as precedent tomorrow, when the current
convention will have morphed into a different one.

There is no deductive, infallible passage from past to future conformity, no “hardness of
the logical must.” Rather, between the expression of a rule and the agent‟s action there is
a causal connection. Such a connection may be based on training, as the interlocutor
suggests in §198 (my emphasis):

What sort of connexion is there here?—Well perhaps this one: I have been
trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.
[—]But that is only to give a causal connexion […]
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Or it can be revealed through inductive reasoning, invoked within rule-following by the
notion of convention and hence of precedent. Lewis was aware of the importance of
inductive reasoning in his theory of convention31, and in describing the process that gives
rise to the infinite series of replication of one‟s partner‟s expectations he notices that they
need “mutual ascription of some common inductive standards and background
information, rationality, mutual ascription of rationality, and so on32.” Such inductive
standards need to be common (and to be common knowledge as well) for Lewis‟s
argument to go through. The commonality of our everyday inductive practice relies of the
commonality of those standards, but there is no explanation available for the
commonality of inductive standards. Similarly, Wittgenstein warns us that “the standard
[of good grounds] has no grounds!” (§482.) It simply is the precondition of there being a
certain language-game that we all share common standards, that we all use the same
idiom of life rooted in our common Lebensform.

These considerations suggest to understand the rich and profound notion of Lebensform
as containing those grounding inductive standards that are a fundamental part of Lewisian
conventions. Agreement in form of life then would entail agreement in inductive
standards which in turn brings about agreement in beliefs, expectations and preferences
about one another‟s conformity to precedent. The system of concordant beliefs about

31

For a detailed formal reconstruction and discussion of the inductive processes implicit in Lewis‟s account
of convention, cf. Cubitt and Sugden (2003).
32
Cf. Lewis (1969: 56-7.)
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each other conformity—the strategic structure of society—inductively stem from the
fundamental agreement in form of life. In turn, from our concordant beliefs and
conditional preferences stem our conventions and customs, and our common knowledge
thereof, hence our capacity to reach a consensus in actions, that is, to follow a rule.

5. Precedent and Blind Action

Perhaps common knowledge is not necessary at all in order to maintain a social
convention, and the form of life can be shared by agents unaware of sharing it. A problem
with this account is that inductive reasoning generates common knowledge which is, by
itself, insufficient to provide a justification of conformative behavior. Indeed, as Margaret
Gilbert tersely points out in (Gilbert 1990), in Lewis‟s account of convention practical
rationality does not yield any justification to act in conformity to precedent. Common
knowledge of rationality and of past conformity is insufficient to deductively establish
conformity in the case at hand33. In a sense, the notion of precedent lies at bedrock, where
the spade is turned (§ 217) and one acts blindly (§ 219) conforming to the convention and
obeying the rule by habit, or because of a psychological tendency34 to be a „conformist‟.
The connection between rule and action can become so entrenched to make rulefollowing behavior automatic, blind. Wittgenstein speaks of “blind action,” Gilbert
33

On the other hand, Weirich (2007) has recently argued that two rational agents playing a coordination
game can bring about reasons to act coordinatively by forming foreseeable intentions to perform such acts.
34
On the tendency of agents` to be „conformist‟ in recurrent coordination games, cf. the fascinating
conclusions drawn from experimental studies in Guala (2008).
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speaks of an “a-rational tendency.” For McDowell (1984), understanding is precarious
and contingent, for there is no guarantee that my current grasping of a concept will
continue to function tomorrow as well35. Williams (1989:169) points out that once an
individual has come to master a given rule, she has acquired a second nature, having
reached bedrock and acting blindly without ultimate justification.

In evolutionary game theory, rationality is an emergent property of the behavior of arational individuals programmed to follow given strategies. In this sense, such models are
well suited to account for Wittgensteinian blind action. In Skyrms‟s evolutionary
approach, the emergence and sustenance of stable social conventions is guaranteed by the
dynamics of the model. In this paragraph we offer a version of the argument to model
Kripke‟s example of addition, developing the suggestion (cf. Skyrms 1996, ch. 5) that
evolutionary models of convention can used to defuse the skeptical paradox.

In evolutionary game theory, we consider a population of individuals. It is assumed that
pairs of individuals meet at random and interact in a game. It is assumed also that each
individual is “programmed” to choose a given strategy. Outcomes are assigned a payoff
that represents not the utility, but rather the fitness received by each player. Individuals
who net higher payoffs are more adaptive, and their proportion within the total population
35

Cf. McDowell ([1984] 2002: 70): “at any time in the future my interlocutor‟s use of the expression in
question may simply stop conforming to the pattern that I expect.” And, infra, “[m]y right to claim to
understand him is precarious, in that nothing but a tissue of contingencies stands in the way of my losing
it.”
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will increase. The modeler then chooses a dynamics for the evolution of the population,
and observes the behavior of the system. The replicator dynamics is often used, in which
the growth of the subpopulation choosing, say, strategy S is relative to the difference
between the fitness of S and the average fitness for the entire population. If the difference
is positive, S entails an evolutionary advantage and number of individuals programmed to
play S will proportionally increase. If the difference is negative, S is evolutionarily
disadvantageous and the proportion of individuals playing S will decrease. The replicator
dynamics is often used to model both genetic and cultural evolution, which is the one of
interest here.

What happens when a population of individuals finds itself interacting in the game of
figure 1? The dynamics has three equilibrium points: one in which the entire population
plays R, another in which the entire population plays L, and a third in which half of the
population plays R and the other half plays L. The first two equilibria, however, are
stable: if the system is perturbed by any small deviation (for instance, a random mutation,
a mistake in performing a given action, etc.), the dynamics will promptly bring it back to
the equilibrium. Consider the case in which the entire population plays L and suppose
that a group of mutants plays R instead. Individuals playing L will almost invariably meet
other individuals playing L (since by assumption almost the entire population is playing
L, and matching is random), while seldom meeting individuals playing R. Similarly for
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individuals playing R. But the payoff for (L,L) is 1, while the payoff for (R,L) is 0,
therefore the difference between the fitness of those who play L and the average fitness of
the population will be positive (albeit small if the perturbation of the equilibrium is also
small), while the difference between the fitness of those individuals who play D and the
average fitness for the population will be close to -1. Hence the replicator dynamics will
reinstate the “all L” equilibrium when perturbed. Similarly, of course, for the “all R”
equilibrium. The case of the equilibrium in which the population is evenly divided
between R-players and L-players is different. Although it is an equilibrium (the difference
between the fitness of individual strategies and the average fitness of the population is 0),
it is not a stable equilibrium. If the proportion of individuals playing, say, L increases no
matter how minimally, L becomes more fit than R and the number of L-players will
continue to grow until the entire population will be playing L. Similarly, the entire
population will end up playing R if the unstable equilibrium is perturbed (it does not
matter how much) towards R. “All L” has thus a basin of attraction (the states in which
the dynamics leads towards “all L”) containing all states in which more than 50 of the
population plays L and similarly for “all D”. We can illustrate this in the following
diagram:

All L



All R

Figure 2
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where the arrows indicate the direction of genetic drift and the unstable equilibrium point
in which the population is divided equally between L-players and R-players is indicated
by the symbol .

Differential reproduction leads invariably to the fixation of a stable equilibrium, provided
that we allow, as it is reasonable, for random small perturbations. In this kind of model,
agents have no beliefs (nor of course common beliefs), they do not carry out any
deductive or inductive reasoning, and hence it is not necessary that they share any
inductive standard. Once the dynamics has established one of the equilibria as a
convention, agents conform their behavior to precedent and the do so blindly. It is of
course unreasonable to maintain that the idealized assumptions of the replicator dynamics
are apt descriptions of human social behavior, yet these models show that using precedent
as a coordination device can be justified by an evolutionary argument overriding the
skeptical paradox—the salience of precedent is, as it were, naturalized, given that we are
willing to accept the replicator dynamics with its assumptions as acceptable
approximations of our cultural evolution36.

Models based on the replicator dynamics are cogent when used to explain the emergence
of a given behavior, once the material element inherent in social action is taken into

36

Against this idea, cf. especially Sugden (2001).
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account. Consider for instance the traditional example of quaddition37 from Kripke
(1982). An agent who behaves as a quadder in a population of adders is not going to fare
very well. On the other hand, a quadder in a population of quadders is not going to do as
bad. A population of quadders, however, is arguably not going to do as well as a
population of adders. The inability to perform additions more complex than 56 + 56
would seriously hinder the potential for scientific and social progress of the population. A
group of a few „mutant‟ adders will end up taking over a population made mostly of
quadders38.

Thus, if we represent „adding‟ and „quadding‟ behavior with A and Q respectively we
have the following symmetric ranking of strategy profiles: (A,A) > (Q,Q) > (A,Q) =
(Q,A), giving rise to the so-called hi-lo coordination game:

Add

Quadd

Add

(99,99)

(0,0)

Quadd

(0,0)

(1,1)

37

It is the famous rendition by Kripke of the skeptical paradox supposedly recoverable in the Investigations
(cf. Kripke 1982:8-9): quaddition is an operation between two numbers x and y such that it yields as a
result x+y if the two numbers are less than 57, and 5 otherwise. If an individual has never summed up
numbers greater than 57, then the rules of addition and quaddition are practically indistinguishable, hence
the skeptical paradox.
38
Someone could use considerations as this one to support an individualistic view of rules as based on an
„internal grammar‟ (a la Backer and Hacker 1984). Of course—would the objector go—adders would take
over a quadding society: after all, when it comes to adding numbers, adders are right and quadders are
wrong. However, the reason why adders take over in the context of my argument has less to do with the
fact that quadders are „wrong‟ than with the fact that quadders are worse off. Recall that, in fact, my
considerations are made in the context of a skeptical solution.
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Figure 3.

The game is a coordination game of the same kind of the one introduced in section 1,
except that here the payoff for coordination of the two pure strategy (A,A) and (Q,Q)
equilibria differ. As in the game of section 1, the hi-lo game also has an equilibrium in
mixed strategies. The probability of playing A in the mixed equilibrium depends on the
size of the payoffs and in the game depicted in figure 3 is (.99 A; .01 Q). We can interpret
the game as played among individuals in a population P, and analyze it evolutionarily. In
the evolutionary analysis, we have two stable states corresponding to two (strict) pure
strategy equilibria (A,A) and (Q,Q) of the hi-lo game. In such states, all individuals in P
play A and Q, respectively. There also is one unstable state in which both A and Q are
played, corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the hi-lo game. In this state
1% of the population play Q while 99% of the population play A. Each stable state has a
basin of attraction immediately to the left and right of the unstable equilibrium, as
represented in the following diagram:

All Q



All A

Figure 4

The basins meet at the mixed equilibrium point. Hence, the size of the basin of attraction
of the inferior equilibrium (Q,Q) depends on the magnitude of the distance between the
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fitness yielded by (A,A) and the fitness yielded by (Q,Q). If we assume that a population
of quadders finds itself at a very strong disadvantage vis-à-vis a population of adders
(that is, the payoff for (Q,Q) is much lower than the payoff for (A,A)), then the likelihood
that quadders will take over the entire population remains low. Even though it is possible
to imagine a community in which everyone is a quadder, it will however be precarious: a
sufficiently strong perturbation can rather easily push the population in the basin of
attraction of the more efficient adding equilibrium. If, as Skyrms points out39, in the case
of symmetric coordination games as the one in figure 1 the emergence of a convention is
a “moral certainty” yet which convention is selected remains largely a “matter of
chance,” in the case of the hi-lo game, which captures essential features of the Kripkean
example, chance plays a lesser role, since the basin of attraction of the efficient
equilibrium is so much greater.

7. Conclusion
Game theory sheds new light on the notoriously obscure pages of the Investigations
dealing with rule-following. Taking at face value Wittgenstein‟s indication that following
a rule requires that a convention be in place, I have used David Lewis‟s game-theoretic
account of convention to clarify how rule-following presupposes agreement an
coordination in a community. In so doing, the role played by the community is made
more perspicuous, and in particular we have seen that the strategic component is crucial
39

Cf. Skyrms 1996:93.
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of a full understanding of rule-following. Game theory and the Lewisian analysis of
social conventions shed light also on two notions related to rule-following. The notion of
Lebensform is illuminated if looked at next to the technical notion of common knowledge,
and the notion blind action is clarified in the evolutionary approach. As I have already
stated above, I am not claiming that game theory can cover all subtle nuances in
Wittgenstein‟s notion of language-game, and neither I claim that hard interpretative
issues (for instance that of solipsistic vs. communitarian reading of rule-following) can be
settled by game theory once and for all. However, I do believe that I have singled out a
group of notions in the Investigations which find precise counterparts in normal gametheoretic ones. Finally, if my analysis does not of course purport to be historical in
character, still it highlights that the later Wittgenstein already contains seeds of a
philosophy of social sciences that has found voice first in David Lewis‟s seminal study
and that, today, continues to grow at the intersection of philosophy and game theory.
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